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Introduction
Virtually all countries have foreign representation e.g. in the form of embassies and consulates.
However, as information costs fall in the era of the internet, the raison d´être of foreign representations is in question, as pointed out by Rose (2007) . The response of the foreign services in many countries is that their activities are important for promoting trade. This would be particularly true for Sweden, which is a small open economy that has not been involved in military con ‡icts for 200 years. 1 Given the large sums spent on maintaining embassies abroad and the popular aim of governments to promote the exports of "Small-and Medium-Sized Enterprises" (SMEs) it is surprising how little we know about how trade promotion via the foreign service a¤ects di¤erent types of …rms.
The authors thank Peter Fredriksson and seminar participants at ETSG 2013 and Lund University for comments and suggestions. Financial support from the Swedish Research Council, the Wallander Hedelius Foundation and the Marianne and Marcus Wallenberg Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. We especially thank Esther Ann Bøler för assistance with the Norwegian data. This paper was earlier circulated under the name "The heterogeneous e¤ects of trade facilitation: theory and evidence". 1 This paper uses Swedish …rm level data from 1997-2007 to measure the e¤ect of Swedish embassies on Swedish exports. We start out from a theoretical framework of heterogenous …rms following Melitz (2003) , where the role of embassies is to diminish …rms' …xed entry cost to the country where an embassy is located. One central result from the model is that export promotion allows smaller …rms to export. However, the largest …rms that already export and the very small …rms that never export are not a¤ected by lower entry costs. The theoretical results from this exercise is taken to data.
We test for the e¤ect of trade promotion on the extensive margin by combining …rm-level data on the exports by destination of Swedish …rms with information on the location of Swedish embassies abroad. We …nd that a larger number of medium-sized and large …rms begin exporting to countries after Sweden opens an embassy, and that the number drops when Sweden closes an embassy. This evidence lends support to our theoretical model. We …rst perform the analysis at the industry-level and …nd that embassies are associated with a 5% increase in the number of exporters. We then perform the analysis dividing exporters into quartiles dependent on the number of employees relative to other …rms in their industry. Using this more disaggregated data we …nd that the e¤ect of an embassy is strongest in the third and fourth quartiles of the …rm size distribution. The point estimates suggest that embassies are associated with a 12% and 5% increase in the number of exporters from the third and fourth quartiles respectively.
In order to establish that our results are consistent with the hypothesis that export promotion via the foreign service reduce entry barriers we examine the extensive margin of exporting before, during, and after the embassies were built. We detect a distinct increase in medium-sized exporters after an embassy is built.
In order to get a stronger identi…cation, we use data on Norwegian exports as a control group. Norwegian and Swedish …rms are from a global perspective highly similar in many respects, including location. In a placebo regression we …nd that the number of Norwegian exporters did not respond to the opening and closing of Swedish embassies, which suggests that the results are not driven spuriously by other factors that a¤ect both economic and diplomatic openness. We also use a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach with Swedish …rms in the treatment group and Norwegian …rms in the control group. 2 Our results are robust to a several robustness checks such as restricting the sample to industries with low levels of …rm concentration and to include only countries where Swedish embassies were opened. While many studies have studied the impact of trade promotion in its many forms on aggregate trade and various extensive and intensive margins of trade, the heterogenous response in terms of …rm size has received less attention. 3 Using aggregate cross-country data, Rose (2007) …nds a positive and signi…cant e¤ect of a country's foreign service on it's export, Lederman, Olarreaga, and Payton (2010) …nd that national export promotion agencies have a positive 2 An exception is of course the Norwegian oil industry, which is left outside our analysis.
3 Our paper is also related to the large literature on the e¤ects of unilateral trade reforms at the …rm level (see e.g. Tre ‡er (2004) , and Breinlich and Cuñat (2010)) 2 impact on exports, and Nitsch (2007) …nds that state visits promote trade. These results on aggregate trade ‡ows do not inform us of whether export promotion promote export by increasing the exports of existing exporters (intensive margin) or if they make it easier for new …rms to enter the market (extensive margin), and recent work has therefore turned to …rm level data. 4
Recent work has also studied how …rm characteristics a¤ect the response of the intensive margin to export subsidies and grants. Girma, Gong, Görg, and Yu (2009) …nd that the intensive margin of exports is more responsive to export subsidies for pro…t-making …rms, …rms in capital-intensive industries, and …rms in non-coastal regions. Görg, Henry, and Strobl (2008) …nd the intensive margin of exports response more to export grants in larger …rms, measured as the number of employees.
The studies most related to our work are the empirical studies by Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2008, 2010) , who analyse the e¤ect of export promotion by Peru's national export promotion agency PROMPEX. Their identi…cation strategy is to match …rms on observables and then to perform a di¤erence in di¤erence in di¤erence estimation comparing treated …rms before and after treatment to matched non-treated …rms in the same time intervals. Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2008) …nd that export promotion has a postive e¤ect on the extensive margin, but no signi…cant e¤ect on the intensive margin. With the same data Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2010) uses a similar approach but now also divides …rms into quantiles according to export growth. Here they …nd signi…cant positive e¤ects on the export volume for …rms in the lower quantiles, while the number of export countries increase in the lower and upper quantiles.
A di¢ culty is that …rm export growth not directly translates into …rm size. Estimating kernel densities of …rm export levels the previous year shows that export promotion on average is more e¢ cient for small …rms. Finally, Volpe Martincus, Carballo, and Garcia (2012) evaluate the e¤ect of Argentinas'export promotion programme over the period 2002 to 2006. They …nd that the e¤ects are larger for smaller …rms. A limitation of the study is that the data for …rms' export is aggregated over destinations.
Our paper instead focuses on the foreign service and uses a di¤erence-in-di¤erence strategy using Norwegian export data as the control group. We divide …rms into quartiles based on size.
Our estimates show positive signi…cant e¤ects on the extensive margin (new …rms starting to export) for …rms in the fourth quartile of the …rm size distribution.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains the theoretical model. The data are presented in Section 3, and the empirical speci…cation and resuults are presented in Section 4.
Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. M-sector …rms face constant marginal production costs and three types of …xed costs. The …rst …xed cost, F E , is the standard Dixit-Stiglitz cost of developing a new variety. The second F D is an entry costs re ‡ecting the one-time expense of introducing a new variety into the domestic market. There is also a 'beachhead'cost for the foreign market, but this cost can be lowered by trade promotion from the government. The entry cost in the foreign market is therefore F X =d jk , where d jk represents the e¤ect of trade promotion by country j in country k: Trade promotion is …nanced by an income tax. We assume that the beachhead costs (F X ) are symmetric in order to simplify notation but countries'spending on trade promotion is allowed to be asymmetric. 5
There is heterogeneity with respect to …rms'marginal costs. Each Dixit-Stiglitz …rm/variety is associated with a particular labour input coe¢ cient -denoted as a i for …rm i. After sinking F E units of labour in the product innovation process, the …rm is randomly assigned an 'a i 'from a probability distribution G(a).
Our analysis exclusively focuses on steady-state equilibria and intertemporal discounting is ignored; the present value of …rms is kept …nite by assuming that …rms face a constant Poisson hazard rate of "death".
Consumers in each nation have a quasi-linear utility function over goods from the two sectors, while consumer's preferences over the various di¤erentiated varieties within the Msector are dictated by a CES-index. This implies that expenditures on di¤erentiated goods are constant and therefore independent of taxes (as long as endowments are such that both goods are produced in both countries). We therefore leave taxes outside the following analysis.
All individuals in country j have the utility function
where 2 (0; 1) measures demand for manufactured goods, and C Aj is consumption of the homogenous good. Manufactures enter the utility function through the index C M j ; de…ned by
N j being the mass of varieties consumed in country j, c ij the amount of variety i consumed in country j; and > 1 the elasticity of substitution. 5 Our approach to modelling asymmetric …xed export costs is similar to Akerman and Forslid (2007) .
4
Each consumer spends of his income on manufactures, and demand for a variety i in country j is therefore
where p ij is the consumer price of variety i in country j, and P j
the price index of manufacturing goods in country j.
The unit factor requirement of the homogeneous good is one unit of labour. This good is freely traded and since it is chosen as the numeraire
(4) w being the nominal wage of workers in all countries.
Shipping the manufactured good involves a frictional trade cost of the "iceberg" form: for one unit of a good from country j to arrive in country k, > 1 units must be shipped. It is assumed that trade costs are equal in both directions and that jj = 1: Pro…t maximization by a manufacturing …rm i located in country j leads to consumer price
in country k.
Manufacturing …rms draw their marginal cost, a; from the probability distribution G(a) after having sunk F E units of labour to develop a new variety. Having learned their productivity, …rms decide on entry in the domestic and foreign market, respectively. Firms will enter a market as long as the operating pro…t in this market is su¢ ciently large to cover the market entry cost associated with the market. Because of the constant mark-up pricing, it is easily shown that operating pro…ts equal sales divided by . Using this and (3), the critical 'cut-o¤'levels of the marginal costs are given by:
where B j =P 1 j ;
( 1) 1 ;and where 1 2 [0; 1] represents trade freeness.
Trade promotion enters the model through d jk , where d jk > 1 implies that trade promotion by country j is reducing the …xed cost of export for its …rms in country k. d jk is …nanced through income taxation t, but these taxes do not a¤ect the demand for manufacturing goods because of the quasi-linear preferences. Firms will take the entry cost F X /d jk as given when deciding which markets to enter.
Finally, free entry ensures that the ex-ante expected pro…t of developing a new variety in country j equals the investment cost:
Solving for the Long-run Equilibrium
In this section, we apply two simplifying assumptions. First, the model is solved with two countries, j and k. We refer to j as "Home" and k as "Foreign". Second, we follow Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) in assuming the probability density function to be Pareto:
We normalise the scale parameter so that a 0 1: Integrating (8) and using (6) and (7) gives
Using this expression, (6) and (7) gives the cut-o¤ marginal costs. The cut-o¤ for a domestic non-exporters is given by:
where d 1 jk 2 [0; 1] 8j; k ensures a positive solution for the cuto¤. The cut-o¤ cost for exporters is given by
Proposition 1 (Home Country E¤ ects): Unilateral home country export promotion will increase the marginal cost cut-o¤ for exporters at Home, and decrease the marginal cost cut-o¤ for non-exporters at Home if < 1.
Proof: Home export promotion's positive e¤ect on the marginal cost cut-o¤s for Home exporters follows from (12). See appendix A.1 for a proof that unilateral export promotion decreases the marginal-cost cut-o¤s for Home non-exporters if < 1:
This model with asymmetric trade promotion leads to the prediction that unilateral trade promotion at Home leads to a softer cuto¤ for Home exporters due to the lower export beachhead cost. This means that trade promotion at home leads to lower average productivity among those …rms exporting to the particular destination. However, the marginal cost cut-o¤ becomes tougher at Home for non-exporters. This is a general equilibrium e¤ect due to entry of new …rms 6 in Home. Lower export costs increase expected pro…ts for Home …rms, which leads to increased entry. The entry e¤ect of trade promotion can clearly be seen in the equation describing the mass of …rms in each country, which is derived below.
Proposition 2 (Foreign Country E¤ ects): Unilateral home country export promotion will increase the marginal cost cut-o¤ for non-exporting …rms at Foreign and decrease the marginal cost cut-o¤ for exporters at Foreign if < 1.
Proof: Home trade promotion's positive e¤ect on the marginal cost cut-o¤s for Foreign non-exporters follows from (11). See appendix A.2 for a proof that unilateral export promotion decreases the marginal-cost cut-o¤s for Foreign exporters if < 1.
There are two forces that a¤ect …rms at Foreign. The presence of a greater number of Home exporters in the Foreign market toughens competition, while the lower expected pro…ts of operating in Foreign lead to fewer …rms at Foreign. The Home competition e¤ect dominates for Foreign exporters, while the reduced entry leads to a softer cuto¤ for Foreign non-exporters.
We will assume that, in spite of trade promotion, it will never be easier to export than to sell in the domestic market, which implies that a Xj < a Dj 8j; k. The condition for this to hold is
To calculate the number (mass) of …rms in each country, we …rst note that the price index in country j may be written as
where = 1 1 . The mass of …rms in each country can now be calculated using (6), (11), (12), and (13):
This equation shows how an increase in country j 0 s level of trade promotion, d jk , will make it a more attractive location (base) for exporting …rms. Trade promotion will a¤ect the ex ante attractiveness of entry in country j, and it will therefore lead to a higher mass of …rms in equilibrium. This also implies that the number (mass) of exporters increases in the level of export promotion.
Proposition 3 The number (mass) of Home exporters increases in the Home level of export promotion.
Proof: Proposition 1 implies that a larger share of the …rms in Home export because of export promotion, and since @n j @d jk > 0 by inspection of (14) the proposition follows.
We turn now to an empirical test of these results.
3 Data
We use annual manufacturing census data at the …rm level from Statistics Sweden combined with data on opening and closing dates of Swedish embassies abroad between 1997 and 2007.
The …rm level data contains detailed information about …rm exports by destination and …rm, as well as the number of employees per …rm, which we use as our measure of …rm size. Export data from 143 4-digit NACE revision 1.1 industries are included in the analysis.
We measure export promotion using data on the presense or absence of Swedish embassies We include a number of control variables in the analysis such as population and GDP per capita (taken from CEPII data), which controls for destination country market potential.
We also control for o¢ cial development assistance transfers to each country as well as an EU membership dummy variable. We use average manufacturing tari¤s 6 (taken from the World Development Indicators) to proxy for changes in trade costs. Descriptive statistics for these variables are provided in Table 2 . The export destinations in our sample di¤er widely in terms of population size and GDP per capita. More detailed export statistics by destination country are given in Table 3 . There is a wide degree of export heterogeneity across 4-digit NACE industries, with the number of …rms exporting in a given year and destination ranging from zero to 31 …rms. The value of exports also varies across sectors, but Table 3 highlights the fact that exports to all of these destinations are non-negligible.
In the regression analysis we use Norwegian …rm level data for our control group. This data 6 "Tari¤ rate, applied, simple mean, manufactured products" shows the subtantial variation in the number of employees across industries for both Sweden and
Norway. This highlights the importance of measuring …rm size in relative terms using withinindustry quartiles instead of using a raw employee measure in the regression analysis. The …rm size statistics in Table 4 indicate that the …rm size distribution is similar between Sweden and Norway, which suggests that the regression results by size quartile will be comparable between these two countries. Moreover, the average number of employees per industry and quartile between Sweden and Norway is highly correlated, with a pairwise correlation coe¢ cient of 0.36 that is statistically signi…cant at the 1% level.
Empirical Speci…cation and Results
We test for the e¤ect of Swedish embassies on Swedish exports in two main speci…cations in our analysis. First we test the e¤ect of embassies on the number of exporters each year at the 7 We then disaggregate the industry-level data by …rm size quartiles and test whether the e¤ect of embassies di¤ers across quartiles of the …rm size distribution. We use as control export by Norwegian …rms by sector and quartile. We use weighted least squares in all speci…cations, weighting by industry output. Weighting for industry size is motivated in this context by the heterogeneity in industry size across Swedish manufacturing …rms.
Industry-Level Results
Our industry-destination-level regressions use the following speci…cation:
where N ict+1 is the number of exporters from 4-digit NACE rev.1.1 industry i to destination country c in year t + 1. Emb_dum ct is the embassy dummy. d it and d ic are industry*year and industry*country …xed e¤ects and " ict is the error term. Our theoretical model implies that 1 should have a positive sign.
We begin by measuring the e¤ect of embassies on the number of exporters by destination and sector. The results regressing equation (15) are presented in Table 5 . The results in column
(1) include country*industry …xed e¤ects, meaning that the results can be interpreted as the e¤ect of embassy presence on the …rm extensive margin over time. The year dummies controls for any type of trend in export patterns over time. Column (2) includes country*industry …xed e¤ects plus industry*year …xed e¤ects in order to control for di¤erences in export growth across industries that may drive our results. In column (2) Emb_dum ct has a positive coe¢ cient and is signi…cant at the 5% level. The coe¢ cient on Emb_dum ct indicates that the presence of a Swedish embassy is associated with a 5% increase in the number of Swedish exporters within a 4-digit NACE rev. 1.1 industry.
Industry-Quartile-Level Results
Our more dissaggregated industry-quartile-destination-level regressions use the following spec-i…cation:
where N qict+1 is the number of exporters in quartile q from 4-digit NACE rev.1.1 industry i to destination country c in year t + 1. Emb_dum ct is now interacted with four size quartile indicator variables Q r , which take the value of 1 when an observation belongs to quartile r.
d it and d qic are industry*year and industry*quartile*country …xed e¤ects and " qict is the error term. Theory implies that at least some of the 0 s should have a positive sign.
The e¤ect of embassy presence on the number of exporters across di¤erent quartiles of the …rm size distribution, as described in equation (16), is presented in (2), which controls for any industry-speci…c trends in the extensive margin that may drive our results.
Finally, we add size quartile*year …xed e¤ects in column (3) in order to remove quartile-speci…c trends that may be driving our results. Our …nding that medium-sized and large …rms respond most strongly to embassy presence is robust across all speci…cations. In column (3) embassy presence leads to an 9% and 5% increase in the number of exporters in the third and fourth quartiles of the …rm size distribution respectively. The result for the third quartile is robust and highly signi…cant across speci…cations. We …nd no statistical signi…cant point estimates for the …rst or second quartiles of the …rm size distribution. Overall, these initial results are promising and …t our theoretical prediction that medium-sized …rms will respond most strongly to lower …xed costs to export via the foreign service.
The results in Table 6 provide a much richer picture of the heterogeneous impact of embassies on the …rm extensive margin and emphasize that …rm size is an important factor when measuring the impact of the foreign service. Given that the export destinations we study are smaller and more distant we …nd it reassuring that it is the third quartile that responds most to embassy presence, as these destinations are arguably more "exotic" and would not be served by small …rms.
Pretreatment and Posttreatment E¤ects
Our theoretical approach assumes that embassies make it easier for some …rms to export. However, one may argue that embassies may be built in places where medium-sized …rms have already begun exporting. In order to establish that our results are consistent with the hypothesis that export promotion via the foreign service reduce entry barriers we examine the extensive margin of exporting before, during, and after the embassies were built. If embassies cause exporting then we should …nd no change in the number of exporters prior to the opening or closing of embassies. We focus here on the industry-quartile-level data.
We use the following speci…cation to measure pretreatment and posttreatment e¤ects in the quartile-industry-level data, based on equation (16) The results of the pretreatment and posttreatment estimation for the third quartile of the …rm size distribution is graphically depicted in …gure 1. We focus on the third quartile here because the baseline regression results in Table 6 suggest that it was the quartile that responded most vigorously to the embassy openings and closures. The pre-treatment trend is stable in Figure 1 , with a statistically signi…cant change in the number of exporters in the third size quartile one year after the embassy is opened or closed, with almost no e¤ect before the year the embassy changes status. However, this e¤ect is not visible two years after the embasssy is opened or closed.
Using Norway as Control
Our analysis so far has not considered the fact that trade patterns and diplomatic relations may both be determined by some third factor such as a political or economic event in the destination country. Spurious correlation between diplomatic and economic openness of countries in our sample may be a serious concern. Moreover, we may have a problem of omitted variables at the country-year or country-industry-quartile-year level in our earlier regression analysis.
We address this issue by using Norwegian …rms as a control group since they should not be a¤ected by the opening or closing of Swedish embassies. This identi…cation strategy assumes that percentage changes in the extensive margin of Norwegian …rms ought to mimic Swedish …rms except in the case when Sweden opens or closes an embassy.
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Estimates -2 -1 0 1 2 Years before and after embassy opened Parameter estimate Lower 95% confidence limit Upper 95% confidence limit Figure 1 : Third quartile estimates and the 95% con…dence interval from two years before to two years after opening an embassy. Notes: This graph presents the estimates of Eq. (17) There are many reasons that Norwegian …rms serve as a highly appropriate control group. 
Norway Placebo Treatment
We …rst run a placebo speci…cation by regressing the Swedish embassy data on the number of Norwegian exporters within each size quartile. We predict that there should be no e¤ect of opeing Swedish embassies on Norwegian exporters. The results are presented in Table 7 , using the same …xed e¤ects and controls as Table 6 . We …nd no statistically signi…cant estimates across all quartiles. 9 These …ndings help to reassure that our main results are not driven spuriously by a general increase in economic and diplomatic openness that would a¤ect other countries' exports.
Sweden-Norway Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences
We also employ a di¤erence-in-di¤erences empirical strategy using the Norwegian exporter data and Norwegian embassy status as a control. For each industry-quartile-destination for which we have both Swedish and Norwegian data on the number of exporters each year we calculate the 9 Note that the interaction of Emb_dumct with the …rst Norwegian size quartile dummy is not reported in column (1) of Table 7 . This occurs because there there were no …rms in the …rst size quartile that exported to countries where an embassy was built. The interaction term is thus perfectly correlated with the quartile*year …xed e¤ects and is subsequently dropped from the regression. 
where log (N qict+1 ) = log N qict+1_Swe log N qict+1_N or is the percentage di¤erence in the number of exporters in quartile q from 4-digit NACE rev.1.1 industry i to destination country c in year t + 1 from Sweden and Norway respectively. We …rst-di¤erence the embassy dummy variables, where Emb_dum ct = Emb_dum ct_Swe Emb_dum ct_N or . As in the previous speci…cation, the embassy dummy term is interacted with four size quartile indicator variables. " qict is the error term. d i and d t are industry and year …xed e¤ects respectively. Our theory implies that at least some of the 0 s should have a positive sign.
Our results using the Norwegian data and regressing equation (18) are presented in Table   8 . First-di¤erencing the data controls for all omitted country-industry-quartile-year variables.
We include industry …xed e¤ects in column (1) of Table 8 in order to control for systematic di¤erences in industry-level export patterns between Sweden and Norway. In column (2) of Table   8 we add year …xed e¤ects to control for di¤erential time trends. We also include a control for EU membership since Sweden is an EU member while Norway is not. One drawback to this approach is that we do not always have a match between the Swedish and Norwegian data, which leads to a smaller number of observations in the …rst-di¤erenced sample. Nonetheless, even using this demanding speci…cation we …nd a statistically signi…cant e¤ect of embassies on the fourth quartile of the …rm size distribution at the 5% level. This result provides further reassurance that our results are not spurious. We also …nd that the coe¢ cient on the EU membership dummy is positive and signi…cant.
Further Robustness
We have compared the response of …rms to embassies along the dimension of …rm size as measured by the number of employees. Our rationale is that employment is more consistent over time compared to productivity measures. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile as a robustness check to investigate whether our results hold when comparing the response of …rms divided into …rm productivity quartiles. To this end, we calculate …rm-level productivity using the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) approach, then sort …rms into …rm productivity quartiles by year and industry. The results of using productivity quartiles are presented in column (1) of Table 9 .
We obtain a statistically signi…cant point estimate for the fourth productivity quartile in this case. This result is consistent with our thesis that larger …rms respond most vigorously to the opening or closing of embassies.
While our theory is relevant for explaining how …rms react when embassies are either opened or closed, it can be argued that the opening of an embassy is a cleaner experiment since …rms Macedonia). The results of restricting to embassy openings in our analyis is given in column
(2) of Table 9 . Reassuringly, we obtain a statistically signi…cant point estimate for the third quartile of the …rm size distribution.
Another potential concern is that our results are driven by industries where there are few …rms. We address this concern by restricting the regression analysis to industries that have at least 20 …rms operating each year. The results using this restricted sample are provided in column (3) of Table 9 . Compared to our baseline results, we …nd that a more restrictive lower bound on …rm size leads to a statistically signi…cant response from the fourth productivity quartile. Overall, our results are robust to a wide variety of alternative speci…cations, with the third and/or fourth quartiles of the …rms size distribution responding to embassy openings across our analysis.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to investigate the e¤ects of export promotion by Swedish embassies. We view the export promotion of embassies as decreasing the barrier to entry foreign markets. The importance of a …xed foreign market entry cost will depend on the …rm size, and we therefore focus on …rm size in determining how the extensive margin of exports responds to opening and closing embassies. In doing we directly test the prediction of the Melitz model with unilateral trade liberalization that trade liberalization allows less productive …rms to begin exporting. We develop a Melitz-based model where …rms are heterogeneous with respect to productivity and must pay a …xed cost to entry the entry market, which can be reduced by goverment spending on trade promotion. The model predicts that unilateral trade promotion allows new medium-sized and large …rms to export. We test this prediction using Swedish …rmlevel data and information on the opening and closing of Swedish embassies abroad. Our results hold in several robustness checks, including when we use Norwegian …rms as a control group.
Moreover, the results suggest that the number of exporters increases after the embassy is built, which is consistent with the prediction of our theoretical framework. Our results suggest that embassies play an important role in promoting the exports of medium-sized and large …rms. (2) The e¤ect of home country trade promotion on home's domestic …rms's marginal cost cuto¤ can be seen in the following derivative:
The derivative is negative for d kj = 1 and 2 [0; 1) 8j; k.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2:
The e¤ect of unilateral foreign country trade promotion on home's marginal cost cuto¤ can be seen in the following derivative:
The derivative is negative for d jk = 1 and < 1.
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